For all that might be said to the contrary, the fact is security forces have more often than not failed to come clean as far as counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast are concerned. It is therefore not without reason the "success" of the much-hyped Operation Golden Bird has to be taken with a pinch of salt.
In what has been described as the biggest anti-insurgency operation in the Northeast since the Army's deployment there in the 1950s, security forces claimed to have killed a motley crowd of militants of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF).
While one cannot dispute the fact that security forces did carry out such operations, the contradictory casualty figures they cited of those killed and apprehended has corroded their credibility.
At a preliminary briefing, Army officials stated some 50-odd insurgents had been killed and 35 nabbed when security forces intercepted a 200-strong group of militants. The latter had been trying to sneak into Indian territory along the Mizoram-Myanmar border.
The occasion (the briefing) was the end of a month-long offensive against extremists that was carried out by the Army, Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles and Mizoram Police. The Myanmar Army, too, was reported to have assisted the Indian troops in this operation. Some 11 rebels of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) were also killed.
Then came the conflicting claims. The general office commanding (GOC) of 3 Corps, Lt Gen KM Seth, asserted that 39 militants had been killed and 40 arrested. The GOC 57th Mountain Division, Maj Gen Narendra Singh Gill, however, put the figures at 59 killed and 54 caught or wounded.
As if that was not enough, the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), the PLA's political wing, dismissed the Army's claims. The RPF contended that only a handful of PLA and ULFA militants were killed in the incident.
This was not without reason. It is common knowledge that there is no such thing as a PLA-ULA-NSCM(IM)-UNLF axis. The ULFA and UNLF did come together once, but that was more than five years back when the NSCN (Khaplang) had floated the short-lived Indo-Burma Liberation Front (IBRF). The NSCN(IM)'s efforts to launch the United Liberation Front of the Seven Sisters in 1993 with the PLA and ULFA had failed as well.
That the UNLF does not have any base along the Mizoram-Myanmar-Bangladesh border is also well known. Not only that, the NSCN(IM), too, never enters Indian territory through the Chin state of Myanmar where the Kuki National Army (KNA) has a formidable presence. Ever since the Naga-Kuki hostilities broke out, the NSCN(IM) has shied away from Myanmar, where the Kukis enjoy both ideological and logistical support of the Chin National Front (CNF).
Therefore, the Army's claims that the mixed band of insurgents included those from the UNLF and NSCN(IM) fails to carry much conviction. What can be inferred is that Indian security forces made such baseless claims only to gain confidence of the Myanmar Army. Dragging the UNLF into the false claims did serve a purpose, since the outfit upholds the aspirations of not only the Meiteis of Manipur but all ethnic groups of the Indo-Burma region.
Joint Army operations with Myanmar are surprising. After all, India has never made any bones about what it thinks of the junta in that country. By awarding the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding to dissident leader Aung Sa Suu Kyi, India has made its stand clear on the issue. The killing of the Arakanese rebels who are part of the National Democratic Front – the NDF are opposed to the present regime in Myanmar – has to be seen in this light.
Moreover, that the security forces chose the relatively peaceful Mizoram-Myanmar border to launch its much-hyped offensive also fails to impress. Even the most casual and cursory observer of insurgency in the Northeast is aware that the most volatile area in the region is Assam's North Cachar Hills district. Ever since the NSCN(IM) emerged as the most dreaded and most efficient militant outfit in the region, all roads for sub-nationalists have passed through NC Hills district.
The area has become the hub of all insurgent activities in the Northeast for two major reasons. First, because of its strategic location in that it provides militants safe passage into Bangladesh. Second, because a base there provides proximity with all the states of the Northeast, with the possible exception of Arunachal Pradesh. If Operation Golden Bird intended to achieve maximum results, security forces should have concentrated on NC Hills district.
It is in this area that the NSCN(IM) successfully cashed in on the void left by the Hmar People's Convention (HPC) and the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF). By expanding its range of operations from Nagaland and Manipur, the NSCN(IM) has been able to throw all counter-insurgency activities out of gear. The Nailalung railway blast and the killing of Kohima deputy commissioner LV Reddy are cases in point.
The "encounter" between Assam Rifles and Assam Police personnel in Haflong and the Rashtriya Rifles firing in Kohima only corroborate the panic, demoralisation and lack of coordination among the forces deployed in counter-insurgency operations here. Besides, the withdrawal of the crack 8th Mountain Division specially raised to tackle Naga insurgency, has helped the NSCN(IM).
No matter how many operations are carried out by security forces in the Northeast, insurgency cannot be wished away. If militancy is to be weeded out from the region, the NSCN(IM) will have to be contained first.
That the Army chose Chandel district, which borders the Sagaing region of Myanmar, for the next phase of its counter-insurgency operations is not encouraging either. It was in Sagaing that the present Naga-Kuki hostilities had originated. The recent clashes in Moreh which left 13 dead could well have been avoided.
The only thing of substance that Army chief Gen Shankar Roy Chowdhury pointed out during his visit to the region after Operation Golden Bird, was in his admission that while troops can contain insurgency, for a permanent solution political means will have to be explored.
But then, is anyone at the ministry of home affairs listening? SB Chavan, the minister concerned, and Rajesh Pilot, his deputy, have held meetings once too often in Shillong. These have, in fact, served little purpose – the Northeast Security Coordination Council is yet to take off in right earnest.
If that were not enough, home secretary K Padmanabhaiah has revealed that a comprehensive policy to check subversive activities in the Northeast is yet to be drafted. In the meantime, eyewashes under the guise of Army operations continue. Needless to add, they are unlikely to achieve much.
