Subir Ghosh: The birth of Naga nationalism is seen by many as the submision of a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929. Do you agree that the formation of the Naga Club was the first concrete step towards Naga nationalism?
Thuingaleng Muivah: It would be a serious mistake if one thinks that the submission of a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929 was the birth of Naga nationalism. The Nagas' history did not start with this incident. Alien forces in the past had met with stiff resistance from the Nagas – the Shans from the east and the Ahoms from the west, prior to the British intrusion into Nagaland. The British sufered many setbacks from the resistance put up by the Nagas. All these acts actuated from the love of their country. Indeed, Nagas were zealous of their homeland. The formation of the Naga Club and the submission of the memorandum to the Simon Commission are, of course, historic in that the Naga Club officially repreented the Nagas and the memorandum expressed the national aspiration of the Nagas as a whole.
Subir Ghosh: The death of Theyieu Sakhrie has been decribed time and again as the greatest tragedy of the Naga political movement. Would you agree that the Phizo-Sakhrie divide was the first sign of disunity in the Naga political movement?
Thuingaleng Muivah: T Sakhrie was a man of great intellect. We lost in him that which we cannot afford to lose. But, to safeguard the cause is supreme. The path a nation has to tread cannot be deviated on whatever account and Sakhrie became a victim of it. Phizo upheld the national commitment. We are grateful he did the right thing at the right time. Therefore, it is not a disunity question as such among the people, but blacksliding of a few, unfortunately headed by Sakhrie.
Subir Ghosh: Nothing happened to the Nine-Point Agreement. Significantly, the text of the agreement published by the Naga National Council (NNC) and that kept in the official Indian records are differently worded. Do you think Hydari was sincere about the 10-year clause?
Thuingaleng Muivah: It was simply a shame on the part of any Indian leadership to attempt to fabricate their own commitment. The failure to face the reality is what caused the conflict between the Indian government and the Nagas. It is impossible to believe that there is any discrepancy in the wording in the text of the agreement. Heaven forbid that cheating is done between nations. Sir Hydari was not at all sincere. He was prone to imposing his will by fair means or foul. His attempt to deviate and obscure his commitment gave rise to the scepticism of the Nagas towards Indians. It was none other than Sir Hydari that signed the Nine-Point Agreement officially, formally, and then after a few days flatly denied it saying that there was no agreement as such. What a lie! A man of such standard triggered off the sanguinary confrontation of the last fifty years.
Subir Ghosh: It is still being said by many people that the 1951 plebiscite was rigged, that it was a farce. Do you agree? Could you elaborate?
Thuingaleng Muivah: The plebiscite of 1951 is genuine and most democratic. There is absolutely no question of it being rigged. Indian authorities were invited to witness the holding of the plebiscite, though they failed to turn up. There was no controversy whatsoever over it among the Naga people. It ws not rigged. India has distorted and denied historical facts of the rights ofthe Nagas including the validity of the 1951 plebiscite. They have also reeneged on their own commitments. Such a standard approach to the issue of this importance has wrought a heavy cost in the last 50 years.
Subir Ghosh: The formation of the Naga People's Convention in 1957 was the first sign that the Nagas were divided into two groups: overground and underground. Was this significant?
Thuingaleng Muivah: The name 'People's Convention' was given in 1957 by the Indian government to divide the Nagas by using some Naga officials who were in the pay of the Indian government. They did not represent the Naga people. Therefore, it did not represent either the underground or the overground, as you call them. The Sixteen-Point Agreement in 1963 between these Indian-sponsored groups and the Indian government solved nothing of the issue. Thus, it is not significant. On the contrary, the Indian government is belatedly seeking a solution through the NSCN and the process is under way.
Subir Ghosh: SC Jamir still talks about the implementation of the Sixteen-Point Agreement. What is your assessment about both the agreement as well as Jamir using this issue to score a point over his political opponents? How did the granting of statehood affect the Naga issue?
Thuingaleng Muivah: SC Jamir has done all he could killing the Nagas over the last four decades for implementing the so-called Sixteen-Point Agreement. But paradoxically, the Indian government now realised the hopelessness of harping on it for a solution. Though belatedly, the futility of any backdoor agreement has been perceived in the course of the confrontation – the reality that the issue is with the people also established. The ultimate wishes of a people cannot be decided through suppression. Jamir knows this. Actions are counter-productive, and that is apparent to his government.
Subir Ghosh: Why did the Ceasefire Agreement fail? Was it because of the Government or the Army? Why did the ministerial talks of tthe Sixties fail? Was it because Indira Gandhi was supposed to be very arrogant with the Nagas?
Thuingaleng Muivah: The Ceasefire Agreement of 1964 was bound to fail because –in the first place, neither the Indian government nor its Army honoured the terms of the agreement. They just rode roughshod over their own commitment. On part of the Federal Government of Nagaland, too, seriousness to honour the terms was lacking although the Indian side was much more wanting. Thus, it was to end up in charges and counter-charges. Secondly, both the parties were not sufficiently disposed to understand each other's difficulties. Thirdly, appreciation for each other's problems was almost nil. Next, there was no courage from either side to come forward with points for starting the real negotiations. Lastly, Mrs (Indira) Gandhi took advantage of a rift that had cropped up among us in the latter part of the talks, unilaterally abrogated the Ceasefire Agreement and declared President's Rule. The Peace Mission was dismissed, Rev Michael Scott was expelled, and Jayaprakash Narayan's arrest was demanded in the Indian Parliament for making a proposal. (Bimala Prasad) Chaliha was forced to resign. All these things were done without the consultation of the Naga government.
Thuingaleng Muivah: Yes, the failure of the talks in the Sixties had a fallout on the Naga issue, though it did not influence its course. Yes, the parting of ways with General Kaito, Scato Swu etc was tragic.
Thuingaleng Muivah: The 'Revolutionary Government of Nagaland' surendered, but without entering into any official agreement. Of course, the Shillong Accord is the Shillong Accord. These two types of surrenders were not signs that people did not want to carry on the armed resistance, nor were they signs of disagreement on armed resistance. They were misled by a few elements in their leadership.
