David Rudgers, is an independent historian who was formerly a staff archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, DC before joining the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as editor and senior intelligence analyst, retiring in 1998 after 22 years of service. He holds a doctorate in history from George Washington University, and began his study of the CIA's creation during his tenure at NARA, and continued his research on his own time from 1990 to 1999.

Rudgers's argues that William J "Wild Bill" Donovan, the former chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from 1942-1945, was not a prime mover behind the founding of the CIA. This is in direct opposition to the "official" CIA history, 'Donovan and the CIA,' written by Thomas Troy (1975, 1981), who prior to his retirement was Middle Eastern Affairs analyst in the CIA's Office of Training. Rudgers maintains that the creation of the agency was not simply the brainchild of William Donovan but, in reality, was the result of many months of protracted and delicate negotiations among numerous policy makers including Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The United States Congress, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Bureau of the Budget played roles in the creation of the "secret state," the CIA that operates at the margin of the American political process.

'Creating the Secret State' has an introductory essay, ten chapters, endnotes (558 total), an extensive bibliography (over 120 entries), and a 16-page double-column index of predominantly proper nouns rather than topical entries. Rudgers employs archival and other primary documents in preparing his assessment, including resources from National Archives and Records Administration, three Presidential Libraries (Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, and Herbert C Hoover), as well as the papers of Edward Stettinius, George C Marshall, and William J Donovan. The latter documents are in the US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In addition, he uses published primary sources, 12 official publications, 15 Congressional documents, 17 first-person accounts, 26 secondary sources, 13 journal or magazine articles, and 5 newspaper titles.

Rudgers begins by summarising the "dual road" -- domestic and military -- leading to the formation of the CIA. On the domestic side, arguments for an independent agency (similar to the FBI) reporting to the President are advanced versus a military organisation combining features of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Special Intelligence Services, Office of Strategic Services, and the Military Intelligence Division (Army Intelligence, G-2). Rudgers reviews "Post-war Intelligence Policy of the United States" authored by the Joint Intelligence Staff, which promoted concepts that stood in direct opposition to Donovan's "revolutionary ideas." Donovan's initial formal suggestion was submitted to General Walter Bedell Smith (General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff) on 17 September 1943, and emphasised the future needs of overt and covert intelligence operations.

On 18 November 1944 Donovan sent President Roosevelt his formal proposal to establish a peacetime central intelligence organisation. This proposal was forwarded to Admiral William D Leahy, presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) where the plan was critiqued and a constructive counterproposal was prepared. In the first weeks of February 1945, a newspaper reporter published a series of articles about Donovan's "Super Spy System," including the entire text of the November proposal, setting off a political and public furore. The discussion about the "leak" and who provided Donovan's report to the press makes interesting reading. Roosevelt wrote to Donovan on 5 April granting him the opportunity to present his plan, but Roosevelt's death a week later left the decision in the hands of President Truman.

Donovan and Truman met face-to-face on 14 May 1945 -- the only time that they would ever meet -- and Rudgers states that "they never got along and had no regard for each other." Hence, the issuing of Executive Order 9621 of 20 September 1945 dissolving the OSS as of 1 October came as no surprise, and the assets of the OSS were transferred to the departments of State and War. By 22 January 1946, Truman issued a directive for the establishment of a new central intelligence system. The roles of the Intelligence Advisory Board and Alfred McCormack are assessed, especially McCormack's "Central Intelligence Agency" proposal submitted on 6 January 1946.

In a separate chapter, Rudgers reviews popular and scholarly journal articles that engaged in the postwar intelligence debate, but does not give much attention to the public and political effects the ongoing Pearl Harbor attack hearings. He next summarises diverse opinions on the structure and organisation of the proposed CIA and considers the role of the Central Intelligence Group as a transitional organisation. He evaluates the importance of Sidney Souers, interim Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Souers's role in providing the groundwork for the assignment and assessment of personnel, and the preparation of daily intelligence summaries.

The selection of Army G-2 Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, "a dynamic operator," as Souers's successor was critical, and thanks to Souers's careful preparation work, Vandenberg had only "a few loose ends to wrap up," and he assembled the remnants of the OSS and other intelligence units that were being disbanded in the postwar era. Espionage and counterespionage, and clandestine foreign intelligence operations were established, and the Office of Special Operations was created and acquired the FBI's wartime intelligence network in Latin America with Hoover's blessing. The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service was acquired and renamed the Federal Broadcast Information Service, and the Washington Document Center was charged with the translation of captured foreign documents. Legislation to bring the CIA into legal existence is considered in a separate chapter.

The State Department began to perceive the emerging CIA as a threat to its own prerogatives and became concerned with the domination of the agency by the military and a staff which included some of Donovan's "disciples," among them Alan Dulles. Anti-CIA concerns centred on the CIA's role in collecting intelligence versus its role in policymaking. The agency was charged with the responsibility to coordinate government intelligence activities; advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters; evaluate and distribute intelligence information; and performing "other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" as directed by the NSC. The legislative process was complete by 26 July 1947 and President Truman signed the National Security Act establishing the agency. The CIA official opened for business on 18 September 1947. Vandenberg left the CIA to head a now independent U.S. Air Force, and turned over the DCI duty to Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter who was sworn in on 26 September.

In "The Emergence of Central Intelligence", Rudgers focuses on significant developments that transformed the nature and purpose of the CIA. Among the key elements he discusses are the "collapse of the grand alliance" and the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe, escalating instability in the Far East, concern about nuclear proliferation, friction and resentment of the CIA by "older" organisations (eg, FBI and Department of State), and the need for the clandestine collection of information. Significant to the agency was the formal definition of covert action and the selection of General Walter Bedell Smith as the DCI replacing Hillenkoetter on 7 October 1950, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), America's first peacetime covert organisation, was established.

The Korean War forced the United States to focus on building a modern intelligence system and the CIA would assume its present structure under Smith's reorganisation plan. The position of DDCI (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) was established (and filled by Allen Dulles), a Directorate of Plans was created, and the Office of National Estimates (a long-range covert/clandestine analysis group) was revitalised. Smith left the agency in 1953 to become Under Secretary of State in Eisenhower's administration. Lastly, Rudgers point out that the CIA never came to dominate the U.S. government intelligence apparatus as Donovan had envisioned, and that the FBI and military retained major intelligence operations. He concludes that any resemblance of the CIA to the OSS is coincidental.

Rudgers has written the definitive assessment that supplants Arthur B Darling's 'The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950' written in 1953 (but published in 1990) and Bradley F Smith's 'Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA' (1993).) Several scholars argue that that the best overall histories of the CIA are written by British nationals John Ranleigh 'The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA' (1986) and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones 'The CIA and American Democracy' (1989). Reflecting his training as an historian and archivist, David Rudgers has written a provocative, well-documented assessment of the founding of the CIA. He has taken the "unpopular" position that is contrary to the generally accepted version of agency history that William J Donovan played a significant role in establishing the CIA. This volume is carefully crafted, eloquently written, and meticulously researched, and its persuasive, compelling arguments make it essential reading on the history of the creation of the agency. This significant volume provides new insights on the creation of the CIA during the transitional years from the end of World War II to earliest phases of the Cold War, and Rudgers has succeeded in documenting his contention that a postwar intelligence organisation developed institutionally among federal government policy makers in response to a perceived need.