Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism is different from other fundamentalisms in that there is no insistence on strict behavioural standards and believers do not form a coherent, readily identifiable group. Although there is no "sacred" text or scripture that serves as a blueprint for society, the authors argue that the mythohistorical tract, the Mahavamsa, carries canonical authority. Steven Kemper is quoted saying that "the Mahavamsa has become the warrant for the interlocked beliefs that the island and its government have traditionally been Sinhala and Buddhist".

The editors emphasise that Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism is "determined not only by historical tradition and ideology, but by politics as well... As our essayists argue, Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism, used as a platform for politicians and patriots since the late nineteenth century, is concerned directly with power and dominance, especially dominance by the ethnic majority, the Sinhalese."

Inexplicably, and this is the major weakness of the book, there is no discussion of the one minority - the Tamils of the North-East - which have refused to reach a subservient accommodation with Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalism. There is so little acknowledgement of this prominent exception that one is led to feel that these Tamils now live in another land in the minds of the authors and editors of the book.

George Bond writes on "Conflicts of Identity and Interpretation in Buddhism: The Clash between the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement and the Government of Pres. Premadasa," which is about two contrasting interpretations of Buddhism. He calls them both variations of Buddhist fundamentalism with one being 'political' and the other 'socially engaged.' The political strand emphasises identity without requiring that the government follow or enact Buddhist values, while Sarvodaya emphasises the primacy of values over identity.

Chandra de Silva, in "The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into Views Among Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka," argues the variety of views relating to the ideal social and political order among Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka is often masked by the great concern for an appearance of a "unified" front. The continuing tensions and contradictions, he maintains, between Buddhist doctrinal tradition and twentieth-century nationalist ideology among Sinhala-Buddhist monks illustrates not only a different kind of fundamentalism, but also provides clues on strategies that might be adopted to foster greater tolerance."

Oddvar Hollup writes on "The Impact of Land Reforms, Rural Images, and Nationalist Ideology on Plantation Tamils." He says, "Because the Sinhalas - the majority and politically dominant group - historically have failed to recognise (or at least have refused to consider) Sri Lanka a plural society in its implementation of a cultural policy and its definition of nationhood, the situation for Sri Lankan ethnic minorities generally has been one of negotiation and accommodation." This 'generally,' of course, contains one big exception, which is really not discussed. Hollup analyses land reform of the tea plantations on which hill country Tamils work and ends with " Land reforms and nationalisation of the plantations represent politically motivated means to build up electoral support, especially since the distribution of state resources has functioned as an important means of political patronage. The state, defined as a Sinhala-Buddhist one, became committed to support the Sinhala peasantry as a moral obligation. As a result, land reforms were conducted in the name of the peasantry by the landed elite, rather than springing from demands and discontent among the peasantry."

Pradeep Jegananthan "In the Shadow of Violence: 'Tamilness' and the Anthropology of Identity in Southern Sri Lanka" writes about how Tamils in Colombo live in the constant expectation of violence and the coping mechanisms they have to deal with this which differ based on caste, economic status, place of origin. He gives a detailed case study of 2 families who lived through the 1983 riots. In "Sufi and Reformist Designs: Muslim Identity in Sri Lanka" Victor de Munck defines Islamic fundamentalism as "the construction of an Islamic/Muslim identity based on a 'memory' of a heroic Arabic past and an avowed ideological commitment to Islamic doctrinal practices and beliefs."

Tessa Bartholomeusz in "Sinhala Anglicans and Buddhism in Sri Lanka: When the Other Becomes You" says, "As Oddvar Hollup comments in his essay, language, race and ethnicity, rather than religion, as had been the case until recently, are the most important identity markers for Sinhalas and Tamils in contemporary Sri Lanka...In this chapter, I analyse at what point the majority of Sri Lankan Anglicans saw themselves as a separate religious community..." and ends with "... the history of this convert group is best discussed in relation to the organisation of state power in Sri Lanka. In short, in the present context, indigenization means Sinhalization, a movement toward empowerment."

From the essays comprising this volume, one has also learned that being fundamentalistic is also a particular way in which some people who are religious in the aforementioned regard are simultaneously political. While it can be argued that not all ways of being religious, or more specifically not all ways of being Buddhist, are inherently political in nature, one can entertain the assertion that the quest for gaining or maintaining political power is intrinsic to Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalist religiosity. Taking this one step further, one tends to conclude, on the basis of reviewing the previous essays of this volume, that political power is usually the primary aim for Sinhala Buddhists with the fundamentalist trait. In fact, it seems to be their hallmark.

Laying claim to this conclusion, however, does not mean that the dynamics of the current ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka can be understood strictly along the lines of religious divides. While both Stirrat in his essay and Bartholomeusz and de Silva in the introduction emphasise how religious and national identities were conflated in the colonial context of the late nineteenth century, virtually all the contributors to this volume recognise that language, race, and ethnicity [and class] are now just as important factors in generating social identity and alienation between communities in the present... That is, communal identity, let alone ethnic or national identity, is no longer necessarily coextensive with religion, In fact, being Sinhala or being Tamil is precisely what now divides virtually all Christian communities in Sri Lanka, especially the Roman Catholic.

What is primarily significant, then about contemporary fundamentalistic Buddhists is that, like their late nineteenth predecessors for whom religion and ethnicity were largely conflated, their Buddhism is intimately linked to political ideology... In the present, Buddhism is consciously invoked by politically motivated Sinhalas to advance their own empowerment (usually to the exclusion of other communities) or to rationalise their agendas for actions taken against other communities in post hoc fashion.

In the former nineteenth-century instance, the revival of Buddhism contributed to the formation of a new national political consciousness; in the latter instance of the present, Buddhism becomes a powerful trope [figure of speech] for expressing a matured political ideology that may be more appropriately identified as communal (since it is not inclusive enough to be truly national for a multiethnic society). Not only is this political ideology that invokes Buddhism as a trope not really broad enough in conception to be truly national in scope, I would suspect, quite frankly, that it is not primarily religious either, especially since its avowed aims are not ultimately soteriological [theology dealing with salvation] in nature.

The traditional Sinhala adage that 'the country exists for the sake of the religion,' as a statement that formerly characterised the rationale for Buddhist kingship in Sri Lanka and other Theravada countries, would no longer seem to hold in relation to the aims of these political Buddhists. Rather, it may be more accurate to say that for fundamentalistic Sinhala Buddhists of the present, the religion exists for the sake of those aspiring to control the state. Buddhism is a trope of continuing powerful appeal in a world of political expediencies.

Having said that, it also needs to be emphasised that since the 1950s, politics among the Sinhala constituency has been dominated by just such appeals to Buddhism for the sake of legitimisation and in the service of expediency. Since that time Buddhism has been afforded a special place in the nation's series of constitutions with each new government stopping just short of declaring it, de facto, the official religion of the state. In practice, or de jure, it has functioned as such, at least publicly, for the Buddhists in power."

In the end, however, this may prove to be an overly idealistic sentiment, much too much to expect in a South Asian political climate which continues to be fragmented or totalized by appeals to religion and ethnicity. Sri Lanka is certainly not alone in this struggle. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives are essentially Islamic states, while India is witnessing a surging wave of Hindu fundamentalist politics. Whatever the future portends, more totalizing or fragmenting politics or not, religion, fundamentalistic or not, is certain to remain an important player in the dynamic."